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Abstract
This paper studies a Tiebout model with two school districts, housing markets and
peer e⁄ects to re-evaluate the optimality properties of the allocation of households
to districts induced by head and income taxes. The main novel results reveal that
head taxes are not superior to income taxes and that the indirect redistribution
implied by income taxation is not necessarily at odds with location optimality or
associated to welfare losses. Many combinations of head taxes di⁄erentiated by
household type can sustain the optimal outcome as an equilibrium. While this may
not be possible using di⁄erentiated income taxes, a combination of non-di⁄erentiated
ones and di⁄erentiated head taxes levied on the residents of the rich district can
lead to the optimal outcome and e⁄ect signi￿cant local redistribution. In turn,
non-di⁄erentiated head taxes are suboptimal (unless optimality requires one of the
districts to be type-homogeneous) and a combination of uniform income taxes and
head taxes levied on the rich district￿ s population can do as well as them. Moreover,
non-di⁄erentiated income taxes may generate smaller welfare losses than their lump-
sum counterpart, a result which clashes with the bene￿t view of head taxes.
Key words: Tiebout, peer e⁄ects, head tax, income tax, optimality.
1 Introduction
In his seminal contribution, Tiebout (1956) suggested that head taxes would
lead to an optimal sorting of households into homogenous jurisdictions, which
would therefore select the optimal level of local public good provision unan-
imously. Tiebout did not formalise his argument, which thus became the
Tiebout hypothesis. Bewley (1981) among others formalised the result, pro-
viding a set of conditions under which the Tiebout hypothesis holds. These
included at least as many jurisdictions as household types, the use of local
head taxes and a technology of production of the local public good exhibit-
ing constant and identical marginal costs with respect to the population. In
Preprint submitted to Elsevier Science 4 April 2011a recent contribution, Calabrese et al. (2010) extended the result to a less
stylised framework with housing markets and a smaller number of exogenous
jurisdictions than of household types. 1
Income taxes, in turn, generate welfare losses (Wildasin, 1986; Goodspeed,
1989, 1995). Since households with below average income face lower tax prices
(that is, they receive greater amounts of spending per unit of tax paid), they
do not internalise the true costs they impose on local ￿nances, and end up
living in richer districts than they would otherwise do and bene￿tting from
the implied redistribution. Moreover, to the extent that income taxes distort
tax prices they also distort the political process.
The assumption that the costs of provision of the local public good are in-
dependent of the characteristics of the population is crucial to attain these
conclusions. 2 Yet, such assumption is di¢ cult to justify, especially if the lo-
cal public good considered is schooling. In that context, as parents, teachers,
policy-makers and academics know well, the diversity of the student popu-
lation and the importance of peer in￿ uences make the peer group e⁄ect an
essential element of the problem. 3
The objective of this paper is to re-evaluate the optimality properties of the
equilibrium district compositions induced by head and income taxes in the
presence of peer e⁄ects (or, more generally, of non-anonymous crowding). The
model represents a city divided into two jurisdictions (school districts) with
exogenously given boundaries and housing supplies. Each district provides tax-
funded public education to its residents and households choose where to live, a
decision that subsumes the choice of school. 4 Households di⁄er continously in
income, and are of one of two types that depend on the child￿ s ability to bene￿t
1 The Tiebout hypothesis has also been formalised in the slightly di⁄erent frame-
work of club theory. Club models do not incorporate a explicit representation of
land markets and allow clubs to form endogenously. A joint review of the two lit-
eratures can be found in Scotchmer (2002). A succint review of the club literature
on the Tiebout model is in Wooders (1999).
2 For example, de Bartolome (1990) revealed that the peer group e⁄ect could gen-
erate ine¢ ciencies even if local governments relied on head taxes to fund schools. In
similar contexts, other authors (including Schwabb and Oates, 1991, Brueckner and
Lee, 1989, and Conley and Wooders, 1998) have shown that di⁄erentiated taxes are
required to achieve optimality.
3 Recent evidence documenting the impact of peer e⁄ects on student outcomes
includes the work on Kenyan primary schools of Du￿ o et al. (forthcoming) and that
of Lavy et al. (2009) on English secondary schools.
4 As the most prominent example of a local public good, the case of local school-
ing motivates the analysis. Results apply more generally to any local public good
whose technology of production depends on the characteristics of the population
that receives it.
2from education and on the cost of providing her with a unit of school quality.
Peer e⁄ects are simply modeled as the outcome of these di⁄erential crowding
costs: a school with a greater proportion of low cost pupils can provide the
same level of school quality using less resources or provide greater quality
with equal spending per pupil. In order to focus the analysis on locational
optimality, the model assumes that local governments provide the (locally)
optimal level of school quality. 5
The paper adopts a utilitarian normative framework, with the Social Welfare
Function (SWF) being the unweighted sum of utility in the economy. In that
setting, optimality requires households of the same type to be perfectly segre-
gated by income across districts, with higher income ones living in the better
school district. That requirement generates two necessary single-crossing con-
ditions, one per household type. Optimality also demands some income mixing:
relatively low income households of the low cost and high bene￿t type should
reside in the good school district instead of higher income ones of the other
type.
The results of the analysis critically depend on whether household cost-types
are observable and taxes can be di⁄erentiated across them or not. In case they
are, on the one hand, multiple head taxes that di⁄erentiate across household
types can achieve optimality. 6 In a model with housing markets, therefore,
these taxes need not cover the marginal cost of admitting a household into
a district, as in a model without them (e.g. Schwabb and Oates, 1991). In-
stead, the extra taxes households of di⁄erent types pay in the rich district
with respect to the poor one must provide them with the optimal relative lo-
cation incentives (that is, they must generate di⁄erences in the cost of entry
each type of household faces to live in the rich district that internalise the
externalities emerging from the peer e⁄ect). On the other hand, although it is
often possible to ￿nd combinations of di⁄erentiated income tax rates simulta-
neously satisfying the public sector budget constraints and providing cut-o⁄
households with the optimal location incentives, it may well be the case that
none of them ful￿lls the two necessary single-crossing conditions optimality
requires. Notwithstanding, it is always possible to reach optimality by com-
bining anonymous income taxes with di⁄erentiated head taxes levied on the
5 Most of the literature focuses on one of two e¢ ciency questions: whether the
emerging allocation of households to districts is e¢ cient and whether the political
process selects the e¢ cient level of provision and taxation. A recent exception to this
norm is Calabrese et al. (2010). In that paper, welfare losses stemming from voting
distortions are small. Goodspeed (1989) notes that the main critic to the local use
of income taxation concerns the distortions it introduces in the distribution of the
population across districts.
6 Notice that these di⁄erentiated taxes depend on crowding types (which may be
publicly observable) and not on tastes (which are not). See Conley and Wooders
(1998).
3residents of the rich district. At most, the necessary single-crossing conditions
will require the income tax rates to be equated across districts. Therefore,
whilst the single-crossing conditions mark the limits to the compatibility be-
tween income taxes and optimality, they do not rule it out.
Additional counter-intuitive results arise when local governments cannot tailor
taxes to household types. In that case, it is not possible to unambiguously rank
head and income taxes. Anonymous head taxes not only induce a suboptimal
distribution of households across districts (unless optimality requires one of
the districts to be type-homogeneous) but may also be more distortionary
than an ability-to-pay tax. The intuition is the following: whereas anonymous
head taxes do not a⁄ect households relative location incentives, income taxes
generate di⁄erences in entry prices between the marginal (or cut-o⁄) household
of each type living in the rich district (i.e. the lowest income residents of their
type in that district). The reason is that, in general, these households have
di⁄erent incomes in equilibrium. Under some circumstances, such di⁄erences
will imperfectly internalise the location externalities emerging from the peer
e⁄ect. 7 Furthermore, non-di⁄erentiated income taxes, combined with head
taxes that are levied on (or with lump-sum transfers to) the rich district￿ s
population, can match the outcome attained by head taxes. These results
clash with the bene￿t view of local head taxes and imply that income taxes
will not necessarily generate welfare losses with respect to them.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents the
model. Section 3 derives the housing markets equilibrium condition when
households of the same type are income-segregated across districts. The fol-
lowing section obtains the optimal allocation of households to districts. The
analysis then turns to the comparison between head and income taxes. Sec-
tion 5 studies the case where governments can use di⁄erentiated taxes, whereas
section 6 does the same for the case in which taxes are anonymous. Finally,
section 7 o⁄ers some concluding remarks and suggests questions for future
research.
2 The model
A metropolitan area is divided into two communities (school districts) with
￿xed boundaries, labeled as the urban area and the suburbs, and indexed
with j = u;s. Districts provide tax-funded, tuition-free public education of
homogeneous quality (ej > 0) to all their school-aged residents 8 . With no loss
7 This possibility was conjectured by Goodspeed (1989, footnote 12).
8 Attendance to school is assumed compulsory. The probability of admission to a
local school is equal to one if the household resides in the district and equal to zero
4of generality, for the sake of de￿niteness and following the typical pattern of
many European cities, the urban school corresponds to that of higher quality. 9
A population of households with mass normalised to 1 lives in the city. Every
household has a school-aged child. Households di⁄er continuously according to
income and discretely along two additional dimensions: the cost of providing
the child with a given level of school quality and the bene￿t she receives
from it. 10 To present results in the simplest possible setting, there are two
cost-bene￿t types of households. Household types are indexed with i = 1;2;
￿ 2 (0;1) measures the proportion of type 1 households in the population. The
analysis presented below considers cases where crowding and bene￿t types are
correlated as follows: 11
Assumption 1 Type 1 pupils impose smaller congestion costs onto schools
and derive greater bene￿ts from school quality than type 2 ones.
The interpretation is that type 1 households have higher ability o⁄springs and
that the cost di⁄erence is the result of di⁄erential peer e⁄ects operating at
the school level. Peer e⁄ects are thus modeled a-la-Lazear (2001) as the result
of di⁄erential crowding e⁄ects: schools with a larger proportion of low cost
pupils are able to provide the same level of school quality using less resources
(e.g. with larger classes) or greater quality with equal spending per pupil.
The technology of production of school quality is identical across districts and

















ej; c1 < c2
where ni
j stands for the mass of households of type i living in district j, and
c1 < c2. Let ￿c denote the crowding cost di⁄erential ￿c = c2 ￿ c1 > 0.




, and is distributed in the
population according to ￿i (y) 2 [0;1]; i = 1;2. Income distribution functions
are continuous, strictly increasing in all their support D and have densities
otherwise.
9 For simplicity sake, private schools are excluded from the analysis.
10 Most previous analyses in urban public ￿nance consider models in which house-
holds di⁄er along a single-dimension (e.g. Epple et al., 1984, 1993; BØnabou, 1996;
Nechyba 1999). There are however exceptions in which households di⁄er, addition-
ally, along a taste parameter (Epple and Platt, 1998; Kessler and L￿lfessmann, 2005;
Schmidheiny, 2006a, 2006b), a productivity one such as the o⁄spring ability (Epple
and Romano, 2003), or both (Wildasin, 1986).
11 It is important to note that the results on the comparison between head and
income taxes do not depend on the direction of correlation between cost and bene￿t
types assumed. Only the circumstances under which income taxes may generate
smaller welfare losses than head taxes change.
5￿i (y) = ￿0








whilst district j￿ s income distribution functions are given by ￿j (y) 2 [0;1],
i = 1;2.
The model of the housing market avoids well-known existence problems illus-
trated, for example, by Rose-Ackerman (1979) or Epple et al. (1984): districts
have a ￿xed (and identical) supply of homogeneous houses, denoted Hj, and
the total supply is equal to the mass of households that resides in the city:
Hu = Hs = 1=2. 12 Absentee landlords lend these houses out to households
in exchange of a rent. To avoid a source of indeterminacy, I normalise the
suburbs￿rent away to zero. 13 Because housing is supplied inelastically, school
quality and tax di⁄erentials will capitalise into housing prices in equilibrium.
Equilibrium in the housing markets will therefore entail the existence of a rent
premium in the good school district, ru. 14
Preferences are de￿ned over a private composite good (the numeraire), x, and
the o⁄spring￿ s future human capital (or income), h. 15 The latter, in turn,
depends on the quality of education received, e, and the availability of home
inputs, y. A twice continuously di⁄erentiable utility function Ui (x;e;y) rep-
resents preferences over pairs (x;e). Following de Bartolome and Ross (2004),
I adopt a quasi-linear speci￿cation of utility:
Ui (x;e;y) = x + hi (e;y); i = 1;2, (2)
where h is monotonically increasing in both arguments and strictly concave
in e. Assumption 1 implies:
@h1 (e;y)=@e > @h2 (e;y)=@e;8(e;y):
The choice of a quasi-linear utility function not only simpli￿es the analysis
but also completely separates e¢ ciency and equity considerations: because
the marginal utility of private consumption is constant and equal to one (i.e.
12 The assumption of equal district sizes does not a⁄ect any of the results presented
below but avoids the need to determine whether it is optimal to have the larger
district with the better school or viceversa (see Calabrese et al., 2010).
13 This implies that the opportunity cost of the residential use of land ￿ the value of
industrial or agricultural alternative uses￿is normalised to zero.
14 The rent premium may be negative in equilibrium which would indicate the cap-
italisation of higher taxes in the urban area.
15 Because houses are homogeneous they are excluded from the preference relation.
6households are risk neutral), the level of aggregate welfare attained by a par-
ticular allocation of households to districts is invariant to the distribution of
private consumption and taxes in the population. Preferences satisfy:
Assumption 2 Education is a normal good.
Assumption 2 implies a positive income elasticity of demand for school quality,
which agrees with the empirical evidence (Ross and Yinger, 1999). This as-
sumption restricts quasi-linear preferences, requiring home and school inputs
to be complements in the human capital production function. 16 The next as-
sumption establishes the behaviour of local governments, focusing the analysis
on locational optimality.
Assumption 3 Local governments provide the optimal level of school quality
given the local population of pupils, and balance their budget.
Local governments fund their spending with head or proportional income taxes
(indexed with k = H;I) that may be di⁄erentiated across types or not. In the








generically, derives from the corresponding local budget
constraint. The tax-bill function must also meet the feasibility constraint that
household tax payments must be smaller than household income. In the for-
mer case, the di⁄erentiated head tax bills or income tax rates will be required
to ful￿ll these two constraints too. The indirect utility function of a household









= y ￿ ￿
ik
j (y) ￿ rj + hi (e;y)
where ￿ki
j (y) represents their tax bill under the tax system k. A useful tool
in the analysis that follows are the so-called bid-rent functions, which I de￿ne
next 17 :
De￿nition 1 The bid-rent function rk
i (y) (i = 1;2; k = H;I) provides the
maximum amount of the numeraire a household of income y and type i is





and school qualities (eu;es). Bid rent functions are obtained




















The model is static. An equilibrium is an allocation of households to districts,
16 This could be due, for example, to better labour market networking of better-o⁄
parents.
17 For a review of the literature on urban public ￿nance that extensively uses bid-
rent functions see Ross and Yinger (1999).
7a vector of local head tax bills or income tax rates and school qualities, and a
value of the urban rent premium satisfying the following conditions:
E1 Rational choices: no household can increase utility by moving into the other
school district.
E2 Housing markets clear: Hj = n1
j + n2
j; j = u;s.
E3 Local governments balance their budget.
E4 School qualities are optimal given the local population of households.
3 The housing market constraint
In the utilitarian normative framework considered (explained in detail in the
next section), the assumption that education is a normal good implies that, in
an optimal allocation, households of the same type will be segregated across
districts according to income, and that higher income ones will be allocated to
the better school district. I call this property within-types income segregation.
De￿nition 2 An allocation of households to districts satis￿es within-types
income segregation (WTS) if, for any pair of households of the same type but
of di⁄erent income who reside in di⁄erent districts, the higher income one
lives in the urban area.
In an allocation satisfying the WTS property, households of the same type
living in the same district belong to a single income interval and the inter-
vals corresponding to each district do not overlap. The monotonicity of the
income distribution functions then implies that, when households of a certain
type i are present in the two districts, a unique cut-o⁄ income, denoted yi,
exists such that households of that type with income y > (<)yi reside in the
urban (suburban) district. A solution to the Social Planner Problem or an
equilibrium may however have all households of a given type concentrated in
one district. In particular, type 1 households may all concentrate in the urban
district, where the good school is located, or type 2 ones may all concentrate
in the suburbs. Clearly, the former case may only happen when ￿ ￿ Hu, that
is, if the proportion of type 1 households in the population is no larger than
the size of the urban district. In that case, cut-o⁄ incomes are y1 =y and
y2 = y2 ￿ y, where y2 is de￿ned by:
1=2 ￿ ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿2 (y2)]:
The latter case may arise if ￿ ￿ Hu and will have cut-o⁄ incomes y1 ￿y and
y2 = y. Figure 1 represents examples of these three possibilities: panel (a)
depicts an allocation with mixed districts, while panels (b) and (c) represent
cases where the urban or the suburban district is type-homogenous. It is thus
8possible to express the mass of households of each type living in each district
as a function of the corresponding cut-o⁄ income: ni
u (yi) = ￿i [1 ￿ ￿i (yi)]
and ni
s (yi) = ￿i￿i (yi) (where ￿1 = ￿ and ￿2 = 1 ￿ ￿). Moreover, the urban
district housing market constraint (which implies the suburbs housing market
constraint) can also be expressed in terms of the cut-o⁄ incomes:
Hu = 1=2 = ￿ [1 ￿ ￿1 (y1)] + (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿2 (y2)] (4)
Lemma 1 Consider allocations satisfying WTS. Cut-o⁄ incomes are linked





where y2 = y and y2 = y if ￿ ￿ 1=2, and y2 > y and y2 < y if ￿ < 1=2; z is
implicitly de￿ned by: 18
1=2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿2 (y2)] = ￿ [1 ￿ ￿1 (z (y2))] (5)
Proof. The proof needs to establish that, for any value of y2, there exists a
unique value of y1 satisfying (4). Suppose ￿ > 1=2; then,




and the LHS of (5) belongs to the interval (0;1=2]. Given that ￿ [1 ￿ ￿1 (y)] =






< 1, continuity and strict monotonicity of the
income distribution functions and the intermediate value theorem imply that,








such that the housing
market constraint (4) holds. Suppose instead that ￿ ￿ 1=2; then





Hence, by continuity and strict monotonicity of ￿2 there exists a unique in-
come y2 = y such that (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿2 (y)] = 1=2, and another y2 = y such





, again the continuity and strict monotonicity of ￿1 and ￿2 and









such that the housing market constraint (4) holds.
Furthermore, these two properties guarantee that z is continuous and decreas-





(1 ￿ ￿)￿2 (y2)
￿￿1 (z (y2))
< 0. (6)
The analysis focuses on allocations satisfying WTS. These will be characterised
simply with the type 2 cut-o⁄ income y2. Since the human capital production
18 For uneven district sizes, the domain of z depends on the size of the urban district
relative to the proportion of each type of households in the population.
9function displays decreasing marginal returns to school quality, Assumption
3 implies that every allocation of households to districts is linked to a unique
pair of school qualities. For allocations satisfying WTS, then, optimal school
qualities can be written as a function of y2: ej (y2). In the case of anonymous
taxation, that is also true of the tax variables: given school qualities and the
distribution of households across districts, and with some abuse of notation,
it is possible to write:
￿
k











Therefore, under anonymous taxation, to every allocation satisfying WTS, y2,











De￿nition 3 Cut-o⁄ income bid rent functions, denoted ￿k
i (y2), i = 1;2,
k = H;I, provide for any type 2 cut-o⁄ income y2, the maximum rent premium
households of each type with the corresponding cut-o⁄ income are willing to
pay for a house in the urban area, when local policy variables are those in
￿k (y2) if local goverenments rely on anonymous taxation, or those chosen by
the planner otherwise.
For instance, with anonymous taxation, cut-o⁄ income bid rent functions are







































Importantly, note that because z (y), ej (y) and ￿k
j (y) are continuous, cut-o⁄
bid-rent functions are continuous too.
4 The optimal allocation
This section characterises the solution to the Social Planner Problem (SPP).
I adopt a utilitarian approach and de￿ne the Social Welfare Function (SWF)
as the unweighted sum of utility in the economy. I consequently speak of op-
timality instead of e¢ ciency. 19 The SWF includes the utility of the absentee
19 The results in the paper emerge when it is optimal to have di⁄erentiated and
segregated districts, as it is the case with the unweighted utilitarian SWF. Instead,
one could assume a weighted SWF and consider sets of weights for which maximising
the SWF requires districts providing di⁄erent levels of school quality and households
segregating in the form described by WTS.
10landowners, which is assumed linear in the private composite good. The plan-
ner is allowed to use head taxes, which may di⁄er across household types, and
can also make transfers to households and landlords, denoted Ri (y) and RL,









= y + Ri (y) ￿ T
i
j ￿ rj + hi (ej;y), (9)
while the SWF is:
Z y1
y
y + R1 (y) ￿ T
1
s ￿ rs + h1 (es;y)￿￿1 (y)dy +
Z y
y1
y + R1 (y) ￿ T
1
u ￿ ru + h1 (eu;y)￿￿1 (y)dy +
Z y2
y
y + R2 (y) ￿ T
2
s ￿ rs + h2 (es;y)(1 ￿ ￿)￿2 (y)dy +
Z y
y2
y + R2 (y) ￿ T
2
u ￿ ru + h2 (eu;y)(1 ￿ ￿)￿2 (y)dy +
+[RL + rsHs + ruHu]. (10)
The SWF is maximised with respect to ej;yi;T i
j;rj;Ri(y);RL subject to ten
constraints, which include six nonnegativity constraints (ej ￿ 0, T i
j ￿ 0), the
housing market constraint and two local governments budget constraints. 21
The housing market constraint has ￿h as its multiplier and, by Lemma 1, can
be written as:
y1 ￿ z (y2) = 0. (11)


















j (y2) = 0; j = u;s. (12)
The optimal demographic composition of districts is determined by the FOCs
on the cut-o⁄ incomes yi. These yield the following Marginal Social Value
functions:
MSVi (y) = hi (eu;y) ￿ hi (es;y) + ci [es ￿ eu]; i = 1;2:
20 This is only for completeness; quasi-linearity of the utility function implies that
such transfers do not a⁄ect aggregate welfare if this is given by the unweighted SWF
considered.




R1 (y)￿1(y)dy + (1 ￿ ￿)
Z y
y
R2 (y)￿2(y)dy + RL = 0
and has multiplier ￿R.
11Marginal Social Value functions provide the marginal impact on social welfare
of moving a household of type i with cut-o⁄ income yi from the suburbs to
the urban area. 22 The following proposition characterises the solution to the
SPP.
Proposition 1 A solution to the Social Planner￿ s Problem with school qual-
ities e￿
u > e￿
s exhibits WTS. Furthermore:
i) In an interior solution, cut-o⁄ incomes y￿
1, y￿
2 satisfy: MSV1 (y￿
1) = MSV2 (y￿
2),
the housing market constraint and y￿
1 < y￿
2.
ii) In a corner solution, y￿
1, y￿
2 satisfy: MSV1 (y￿
1) ￿ MSV2 (y￿
2), the housing
market constraint and y￿
1 < y￿
2.

















































Proof. Deriving the MSV functions with respect to y, it is straightforward
to check that the normality of education implies that MSV functions are













i) = 0; j = u;s; i = 1;2, (15)
which yield ￿
￿
j = 1. Using that initial result and equation (6), the ones corre-







































which together imply that MSV1 (y￿
1) = MSV2 (y￿
2) must hold in an interior
solution. Next, note that, since e￿
u > e￿
s, Assumption 1 implies MSV1 (e y) >
22 Following Calabrese et al. (2010), I express MSV functions as the social value of
moving a household from the suburbs to the urban area (i.e. the value of decreasing
the cut-o⁄ income of a particular type) to facilitate comparability with the bid-rent
functions and only for expositional purposes.
12MSV2 (e y), where recall e y satis￿es e y = z (e y). Since the MSV functions are ris-
ing in income, then, the optimal cut-o⁄ incomes must satisfy y￿
1 < e y < y￿
2. If
there is no y 2 (e y;y2) such that MSV1 (z (y)) = MSV2 (y), a corner solution
emerges. In that case, since MSV1 (e y) > MSV2 (e y) and MSV functions are
continuous, MSV1 (z (y2)) ￿ MSV2 (y2) and thus it is optimal to have the
urban district populated exclusively by type 1 households if ￿ ￿ Hu, or the
suburbs exclusively by type 2 households if ￿ < Hu. Finally, the FOCs corre-
sponding to the school quality variables eu and es yield the usual Samuelsonian
conditions (13) and (14).
An interior solution has households of the two types allocated to both districts,
as in panel (a) of Figure 1; panels (b), where ￿ > Hu, and (c), where ￿ < Hu,
of the same ￿gure correspond to corner solutions. The equality of the MSV






















On the other hand, the Samuelsonian conditions that determine the optimal
school qualities equate districts￿average marginal rates of substitution be-
tween school quality and numeraire consumption to their respective marginal







Remark 1 Income mixing is optimal. Households of type 1 with incomes be-
tween y￿
1 and y￿
2 are allocated to the urban area, while households of type 2 and
identical income are assigned to the suburbs in the optimal allocation. The
explanation is doublefold as type 1 pupils impose smaller congestion costs onto
and derive greater bene￿ts from the better quality school. 23
5 Decentralising the optimal allocation
In order to decentralise the optimal allocation, the planner must choose lo-
cal tax variables that satisfy the local governments￿budget constraints and
ensure that, in the emerging equilibrium, households derive (weakly) higher
utility in their socially optimal location. Bearing in mind that the optimal
allocation satis￿es the WTS property, optimal tax combinations will need to
make households with cut-o⁄ incomes indi⁄erent between the two residential
alternatives. That requirement will generate a location-incentives constraint.
23 Suppose assumption 1 does not hold but that, instead, preferences satisfy
@h1 (e;y)=@e < @h2 (e;y)=@e. In that case, though some income mixing will be
optimal (except in special circumstances) which of the cut-o⁄ incomes should be
smaller is ambiguous. The reason is that, while the lower costs of educating type
1 children tends to make optimal that y1 < y2, the greater bene￿t type 2 children
derive from school quality has the opposite e⁄ect.
13Two-single crossing conditions will then guarantee that the remaining house-
holds strictly prefer their socially optimal location. The analysis in this section
restricts attention to interior solutions to the SPP for, as proposition 5 be-
low demonstrates, corner solutions will be sustained as an equilibrium with
anonymous head taxes.
5.1 Di⁄erentiated head taxes









j; j = u;s, (17)
















= y ￿ T
i
j ￿ rj + hi (ej;y) (18)
Substituting (18) into the indi⁄erence condition (3) and normalising the rent of

















u, i = 1;2. (19)
Lemma 2 Suppose that eu > es, then the head-tax bid-rent functions are
increasing in income, which implies that households induced preferences satisfy















































; 8y < yi, i = 1;2.
Because a household￿ s tax burden does not depend on income, the normality
of education ensures that head-tax bid-rent functions are rising in income.
That property, in turn, implies that if households of type i and income yi are
indi⁄erent between the two districts, then households of the same type and
higher (lower) income strictly prefer the urban area (the suburbs).
Next, in order to derive the location-incentives constraint, let
￿
h




2 (y2) = h2 (eu (y2);y2) ￿ h2 (es (y2);y2)
14denote the gap in human capital each type￿ s cut-o⁄ households obtain from
attending the urban school instead of the suburban one, when school qualities
are determined optimally. The cut-o⁄income bid-rent functions, derived from
equations (7) and (8), can then be written as:
￿
H
1 (y2) = ￿
h







2 (y2) = ￿
h





If an allocation yH
2 2 (e y;y2) is to be sustained as an interior head-tax equi-
librium, households with cut-o⁄ income must be indi⁄erent between the two
















































The location-incentives constraint is obtained by setting yH
2 = y￿
2 in the head-























Combinations of head tax bills that ful￿ll the previous equation ensure that,
when school qualities are given by ej (y￿
2), the maximum bids households of
each type with the optimal cut-o⁄ income are willing to o⁄er for a house
in the urban area coincide; in other words, that there exists a level of the
rent premium that makes them simultaneously indi⁄erent between the two
districts.
De￿nition 4 Let ￿H (y￿
2) be the set of all combinations of di⁄erentiated head
taxes T i
j satisfying the location-incentives constraint (24) and the local budget
constraints (17) at the optimal allocation.
Clearly, the combination of head taxes covering the marginal cost of admitting
a household of a given type in a particular district, T i
j = ciej (y￿
2), belongs to
the set ￿H (y￿








= ci [es (y
￿
2) ￿ eu (y
￿
2)],
and it is straightforward to check that the budget and the location-incentives
constraints are satis￿ed. Interestingly, in￿nitely many other combinations of
di⁄erentiated head taxes lead to the optimal equilibrium as well.
Proposition 2 Consider an interior solution to the Social Planner Problem




s. For every combina-
tion of head-tax bills in ￿H (y￿
2) there exists an optimal head-tax equilibrium










2). There are in￿nitely many such combinations.
15Proof. First, notice that the elements of ￿H (y￿
2) satisfy a system of three
linearly independent equations in four unknowns, so that the system has one
degree of freedom and in￿nitely many solutions. Proving existence requires
checking that the four equilibrium conditions E1-E4 hold: E3 is satis￿ed by
the de￿nition of ￿H (y￿
2), E4 is ful￿lled by assumption 3, while proposition
1 implies that the housing market constraint E2 is satis￿ed for (y￿
1;y￿
2). The
rational choices condition E1, in turn, requires, ￿rst, the single-crossing con-
ditions (20) to hold and, second, the cut-o⁄ bid-rent functions to be equal






2). The former was proved in Lemma 2, whereas the
latter is again ensured by the de￿nition of ￿H (y￿
2), as its elements satisfy the
location-incentives constraint (24).
Remark 2 In a model with housing markets, many combinations of di⁄eren-
tiated head taxes can attain optimality. These need neither cover the marginal
cost of entry of a household nor be greater for households with lower ability
children. Instead, they must provide households with the correct relative loca-
tion incentives. In other words, they must generate di⁄erences in the cost of
entry each type of household faces to live in the rich district that internalise
the externalities emerging from the peer e⁄ect. The result opens the door for
di⁄erentiated head taxes to e⁄ect some redistribution across household types.
5.2 Income taxes






















j , j = u;s: (25)
where ti
j stands for the local income tax rate district j imposes on households















￿ rj + hi (ej;y), (26)



















; i = 1;2. (27)
There are two district-level variables whose impact on utility varies with in-
come: school quality and the income tax rate. The former makes richer house-
holds willing to pay more than lower income ones for a house in the district
o⁄ering higher quality of education. The latter makes them willing to pay more
for a house located where their group income tax rate is lower. Therefore, the
single-crossing conditions will be satis￿ed if the richer district is able to fund
16its education spending with lower income tax rates than the poor district.
More generally:
Lemma 3 Suppose eu > es. The income-tax bid-rent functions, rI
i, are in-
















8y 2 S; i = 1;2. (28)















































; 8y < yi, i = 1;2.
A su¢ cient condition for these single-crossing conditions to hold is thus ti
s ￿
ti
u. If instead ti
s < ti
u, they require the income elasticity of the demand for
school quality to be large enough relative to the tax rate di⁄erential.
The cut-o⁄ bid-rent functions (denoted ￿I
i) are again deduced from equations
(7) and (8), yielding:
￿
I
1 (y2) = ￿
h











2 (y2) = ￿
h









If an allocation yI
2 2 (e y;y2) can be sustained as an interior income-tax equilib-





















































Therefore, the location-incentives constraint, obtained as before, is:
￿c [es (y
￿
2) ￿ eu (y
￿





















Combinations of income tax rates that satisfy this equation make households of
each type with the optimal cut-o⁄income indi⁄erent between the two districts
at the equilibrium rent premium when school qualities are given by ej (y￿
2).
De￿nition 5 Let ￿I (y￿
2) be the set of feasible income tax rate combinations
ti
j 2 [0;1] satisfying the location-incentives constraint (33) and the local budget
constraints (25) at y￿
2.
17Lemma 4 ￿I (y￿
2) is non-empty if and only if:
￿c [eu (y
￿









Proof. It is straightforward to check that (33) and the two local budget con-
straints (25) conform a system of three linearly independent equations in four
unknowns (ti
j) which, therefore, has in￿nitely many solutions. That set must




j denote group i￿ s tax base in district j. If Bi
j ￿ Ej, i = 1;2,














j < Ej then ti























u = f (t1
u;y￿
2) and t2
s = g (t1
s;y￿
2) denote the local government budget








































, j = u;s. These
functions are strictly increasing in t1
u and t1







s. They reach a minimum at t1
































s. Consequently, letting ￿j be
the set of tax rates imposed by district j on type 1 households, t1
j, that fulsill













, for any element
of ￿u, there exists a unique element in ￿s such that (35) holds. Finally, note
that the sets ￿j, and thereby also ￿I (y￿
2), are empty sets if the images of  u
and  s do not overlap. Otherwise, that is if (34) is satis￿ed, ￿j and ￿I (y￿
2)
are non-empty.
Lemma 4 does not impose a restrictive condition: the RHS of (35) is the sum of
the taxes a type 1 cut-o⁄household would pay in district s if type 2 residents
did not pay any and those a type 2 cut-o⁄household would pay in district u if
their type 1 neighbours did not pay any. That sum must be greater than the
additional cost of educating a type 2 household (instead of a type 1) in the
urban area (rather than in the suburbs). Nevertheless, the elements of ￿I (y￿
2)
may not sustain an optimal equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Consider an interior solution to the Social Planner Problem
with optimal cut-o⁄ incomes (y￿
1;y￿
2) and satisfying e￿
u > e￿
s. A combination of
local income tax rates in ￿I (y￿
2) sustains the optimal allocation as an equilib-









2 if and only if the two pairs of tax rates (ti
u;ti
s), i = 1;2; satisfy Lemma
3.
18Proof. The proof is analogous to the one of proposition 2 and is omitted for
the sake of brevity.
Remark 3 The existence problem emerges because ￿I (y￿
2) may be an empty
set and, even if it is not, it may be that no element satis￿es the necessary
single-crossing conditions. 24 Therefore, the optimal allocation may not be sus-
tainable as a market equilibrium with di⁄erentiated income taxes.
Notwithstanding, the next proposition proves that it is possible to combine
anonymous income taxes with another ￿scal tool to correct for their distor-
tionary location e⁄ects. If the anonymous income tax rates that balance the
local goverenments￿budgets satisfy the single-crossing conditions, then the lo-
cation externalities can be internalised with a self-funded lump-sum transfer
scheme among households of di⁄erent types that live in the urban district. If











the proposal involves applying the suburbs￿tax-rate to the urban area and
imposing di⁄erentiated head taxes to correct for the location externalities and
to fund the resulting de￿cit, Du. 25
Proposition 4 Consider a solution to the Social Planner Problem with opti-
mal cut-o⁄ incomes (y￿
1;y￿
2) and satisfying e￿
u > e￿
s. Suppose that local govern-
ments use anonymous income taxes to fund education.
1) If the vector of local policies ￿I (y￿
2) and household preferences satisfy lemma
3, then, the unique self-funded lump-sum transfers scheme from type 2 to type





u = 0 (36)








2)(tu ￿ ts) (37)
sustains the optimal allocation as an income tax equilibrium.
2) In other case, setting the urban area tax rate at tu = ts (y￿
2), the unique
24 Wildasin (1986) showed that a set of personalised income tax rates adjusted so
that the tax payment of every household is equal to its marginal congestion cost
in every district would achieve the normative objective. That solution, which is
valid when all types are present in all districts in the optimal outcome, does not
necessarily extend to the current setting where only two indi⁄erent types will exist
in equilibrium. In general, the proposed taxes must also provide the optimal location
incentives for types that concentrate in a subset of locations. This further restricts
the set of income taxes that implement the optimal solution. In the current context
in particular, the proposed taxes would also need to satisfy the relevant single-
crossing conditions.
25 Correcting for location externalities could be achieved in other ways as well. For
example, with a transfer between households of a given type living in di⁄erent
districts.
19di⁄erentiated head-tax scheme imposed on urban residents
￿





u + b T2n
2
u = Du (38)





sustains the optimal allocation as an income tax equilibrium.
Proof. Clearly, both systems of equations have a unique solution. Equations
(36) and (38) guarantee, in each case, that the scheme is either self-funded
or covers the budget de￿cit arising in the urban district Du. Hence, both
proposals ensure that the two local budget constraints are satis￿ed. Under












2) ￿ ts (y
￿
2))
Therefore, without the proposed schemes, the optimal allocation cannot be
sustained as an equilibrium. 1) In this case, the proposed scheme reduces
the willingness to pay for a house in the urban area of every type 2 house-
hold by an amount equal to L2 and increases that of type 1 households by
L1. Equation (37) requires the sum of both to cover the di⁄erence between
cut-o⁄ households￿"optimal" relative willingness to pay ￿c [e￿
s ￿ e￿
u] and the
one induced by income taxes (y￿
1 ￿ y￿
2)(tu (y￿
2) ￿ ts (y￿
2)). Because lemma 3
holds by assumption, the scheme is thus able to sustain the optimal alloca-
tion as an equilibrium. 2) Here, tu = ts (y￿
2), so that lemma 3 is satis￿ed.
Moreover, income taxes do not a⁄ect the location incentives of households:
(y￿
1 ￿ y￿
2)(tu ￿ ts (y￿
2)) = 0. Therefore, the proposed scheme needs to increase
type 1 households￿willingness to pay for living in the urban area with respect
to that of type 2 ones by ￿c [e￿
s ￿ e￿
u], which is precisely what equation (39)
imposes.
Remark 4 This result demonstrates that, while single-crossing conditions mark
the limits to the compatibility between optimality, on one side, and income
taxes and the implied redistribution, on the other, these are not incompatible
with each other. As a matter of fact, the second proposal sets a lower bound
for the amount of tax redistribution e⁄ected in the rich district, as the single-
crossing conditions could be satis￿ed for some tu > ts (y￿
2).
The lump-sum transfers implied by the ￿rst proposal could be from type 2
to type 1 households or viceversa. The reason is that the latter have lower
income so that the tax-price of entry to the urban area induced by anonymous
income taxes may be too low for them relative to that required from type 2
cut-o⁄ ones. On the contrary, the di⁄erentiated head taxes that complement
the uniform income tax scheme in the second proposal need to be greater for
type 2 households.
206 The ambiguous comparison between anonymous head and in-
come taxes
Suppose now that local governments observe the marginal cost of providing an







tify individual marginal congestion costs ci or cannot use that information to
tax-discriminate across household types. This section proves that anonymous
head and income taxes cannot be unambiguously ranked according to the dis-
tortions they generate and that income taxes can easily match the outcome
of head taxes.
6.1 Head taxes
In this case, the budget constraints, indirect utility, bid-rent and cut-o⁄ bid-
rent functions are obtained by setting T 1
j = T 2
j = Tj in (17), (18), (19), and
T 1
j = T 2
j = Tj (y2) in (21) and (22). The next proposition reveals that an
interior head tax equilibrium is necessarily suboptimal, while a corner one is
optimal.
Proposition 5 1) A head-tax equilibrium exists.
2) If the SPP has an interior solution, then there exists an interior head-tax
equilibrium. Every interior head-tax equilibrium is suboptimal.





(negative), then there exists a corner (interior) head-tax equilibrium. Every
corner head-tax equilibrium is optimal.
Proof. 1) If eu (y) > es (y) 8y 2 [y;y2], then, by lemma 2, the single-crossing
conditions ensure the WTS property holds in that interval. Assumption 1 im-
plies that ￿H
1 (e y)￿￿H
2 (e y) > 0. Then, if ￿H
1 (y2)￿￿H
2 (y2) < 0, the intermediate
value theorem and the continuity of the cut-o⁄ bid-rent functions ensure that
there is a level of income yH













Hence, such allocation satis￿es the rationality condition of equilibrium E1












. Because cut-o⁄ bid-rent functions embed the
equilibrium conditions E2 to E4, yH






are an interior head-tax equilibrium with rent premium rH. If
instead ￿H
1 (y2) ￿ ￿H
2 (y2) ￿ 0, the corner allocation of households to dis-
tricts y2 also satis￿es E1. In the case where ￿ > 0:5, cut-o⁄ incomes satisfy







there exists a corner equilibrium with all type 2 house-
holds living in the suburbs. If ￿ ￿ 0:5, then y2 ￿ y, z (y2) ￿y and there is
a corner equilibrium with every type 1 household living in the urban area
and rent premium rH = ￿H
2 (y2). Finally, note that if there exists y 2 [e y;y2]
21such that eu (y) = es (y), it is straighforward to check that such allocation
of households to districts, y, the policy vector ￿H (y) and the rent premium
rH = Ts (y)￿Tu (y) leave every household indi⁄erent between the two districts
and, hence, constitute an equilibrium.



























































. The latter implies that any interior head-tax equilibrium is sub-
optimal (i.e. that yH
2 6= y￿
2). The former, along with the fact that ￿H
1 (e y) >
￿H
2 (e y), the continuity of the cut-o⁄ bid rent functions and the intermediate
value theorem, entail the existence of a level of income yH




2 ) = ￿H
2 (yH
2 ) for which an interior head-tax equilibrium exists.
3) In a corner solution to the SPP:
￿
h
1 (y2) ￿ ￿
h





Because the RHS of (??) is negative, its LHS may be negative or positive.
In the former case, ￿H
1 (y2) ￿ ￿H
2 (y2) < 0 and, as proved above, there is a
level of income yH
2 2 (e y;y￿
2) such that ￿H
1 (yH
2 ) = ￿H
2 (yH
2 ) for which an interior
head-tax equilibrium exists. In the latter case, note that
￿
H
1 (y2) ￿ ￿
H
2 (y2) > 0 , ￿
h
1 (y2) ￿ ￿
h
2 (y2) > 0
so that existence of a corner head-tax equilibrium implies that (??) holds and
so the existence of a corner solution to the SPP, and viceversa.
Remark 5 Interior equilibria emerging with anonymous head taxes generate
a suboptimal distribution of households across districts. Residential choices
generate negative externalities because the homogenous tax-bill levied on the
urban residents does not cover the marginal costs of admitting them into the
district, being too low for high-cost (type 2) households and too high for low-cost
(type 1) ones. Hence, too many high-cost households live in the good (urban)
school district in equilibrium.
226.2 Income taxes
This subsection compares the distortions emerging in market equilibrium when
local governments use non-di⁄erentiated head and income taxes. In the latter
case, the local budget constraints and the indirect utility, bid rent and cut-o⁄
bid-rent functions are obtained by setting t1
j = t2
j = tj in (25), (26), (27), and
t1
j = t2
j = tj (y2) in (30) and (31).
As in the case with di⁄erentiated taxes, the possibility that the single-crossing
conditions might not be satis￿ed implies that existence of an income-tax equi-
librium satisfying WTS is not guaranteed. Following a similar argument as in
the proof of the previous proposition, it can be shown that, if eu (y) > es (y)
8y 2 [e y;y2], then either there is a level of income y 2 (e y;y2) for which either
￿I
1 (y) = ￿I
2 (y), or ￿I
1 (y2) ￿ ￿I
2 (y2). In both cases, equilibrium requirements
E2-E4 hold but the implied allocation will only be an equilibrium if the single-
crossing conditions are also met. If an interior equilibrium exists, its cut-o⁄











































The comparison between (43) and the optimality requirement (16) con￿rms
that anonymous income taxes lead to a suboptimal allocation of households
across districts. The next result shows that head taxes may induce greater
welfare losses than income taxes. Figure 2 illustrates this possibility.














. Then, another head-tax
equilibrium inducing larger locational distortions exists.
Proof. In an interior income-tax equilibrium, cut-o⁄ incomes satisfy (43).




































. Using again the fact that ￿H
1 (e y) > ￿H
2 (e y), continuity of
the cut-o⁄ bid rent functions and the intermediate value theorem imply the








2 ) = ￿H
2 (yH
2 ) and for







Furthermore, anonymous income taxes can easily match the outcome achieved
with anonymous head taxes.
Proposition 7 The results in proposition 5 apply to an income tax scheme
that sets tu equal to ts (y) and funds (gives back) the resulting urban budget
23de￿cit (surplus) through a uniform head tax levied on (with a uniform transfer
paid back to) urban residents.
Proof. Because tu = ts (y), the single-crossing conditions are satis￿ed and the
RHS of (43) is equal to zero so that:
￿
I
1 (y) ￿ ￿
I
2 (y) = ￿
H
1 (y) ￿ ￿
H
2 (y):
Remark 6 Results in this section clash with the view of local head taxes as
welfare-enhancing bene￿t taxes. When governments cannot observe the cost-
parameters or use that information to tax-discriminate across households of
di⁄erent types, head taxes may be more distortionary than an ability-to-pay
tax such as the proportional income tax. The reason is that, if an income tax
equilibrium has higher tax rates in the urban area the cut-o⁄ households of
the high-cost type face a greater tax-price of entry into the urban area than
the lower income cut-o⁄ households of the low-cost type. Thereby, the negative
cost-externalities the former impose on the rest are (partially) internalised. 26
Remark 7 Moreover, income taxation can be combined with a uniform head
tax levied on urban residents, or with a lump-sum transfer to them to match the
outcome of head taxes. Therefore, the implied income redistribution does not
generate more welfare losses than those resulting from the use of anonymous
head taxes.
7 Concluding remarks
The analysis in this paper o⁄ers new insights into the relative normative mer-
its of local head and income taxes. The main novel results reveal that head
taxes are not superior to income taxes and that the indirect redistribution
implied by income taxation is not necessarily at odds with location optimality
or associated to welfare losses. In cases where local governments can observe
the cost parameters of di⁄erent household types and tax-discriminate across
them, both head and income taxes are able to sustain the optimal allocation
in equilibrium. Remarkably, optimal di⁄erentiated head taxes need not cover
marginal congestion costs, as the outcome of the location game depends on the
relative willingness to pay for entering the good district. Because optimality
26 It is important to stress that the essence of this result does not depend on the
assumptions made over household types. In particular, an analogous result can be
derived if households imposing smaller costs onto schools also derive smaller bene￿ts
from school quality.
24requires the income segregation of households of the same type in the utilitar-
ian normative framework considered, the necessary single-cossing conditions
for a segregated equilibrium to exist mark the limits of the compatibility be-
tween income taxes and location optimality but do not rule it out. At most,
it may be necessary to set anonymous and identical tax rates in the two dis-
tricts and cover the budget de￿cit that results in the rich district by imposing
di⁄erentiated head taxes on its residents. When di⁄erentiated taxes are not
available, the two tax systems cannot be unambiguously ranked according to
the welfare losses they generate as compared to the optimal outcome. More-
over, supplemented with head taxes levied on, or lump-sum transfers to, the
residents of the rich district, income taxes could always match the outcome
attained with head taxes.
It is important to check the robustness of these conclusions to alternative spec-
i￿cations of the peer e⁄ect and of housing markets, that is to say, to relax the
assumptions of linear crowding costs and of inelastic housing supplies. Two
important questions for further research emerge. The ￿rst one concerns the
comparison of income taxes to property taxes with and without zoning regu-
lations, extending Calabrese et al. (2007) to include peer e⁄ects and income
taxes. The second concerns the relative performance of alternative tax systems
when local tax and spending policies are selected through an electoral process.
It is worth mentioning to conclude that these results suggest as well that, in
the presence of peer e⁄ects, the public sector could use exams and condition
access to schools on the results to derive welfare gains.
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